Surveys conducted in Primorskii krai by the Public Opinion Research Center at the Institute of History, Archeology, and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East (Russian Academy of Sciences) provide descriptive statistics for evaluating shifts in attitudes of Primor’e residents toward China and Chinese nationals (Table 3). The surveys were based on random population sampling (using official residency lists) stratified by age, income, education, occupation, and location. Changes in public opinion in Primor’e on the "Chinese question" from 1991-1994 (when economic benefits from cross-border exchanges increased) to 1997-98 (when these benefits decreased) are summarized in the far left-hand column in Table 3. Scores twice exceeding the estimated average margin of error for the surveys are considered significant and displayed in bold type (for complete data, see Addendum 1). The following trends appear noteworthy:

1. Close to half of respondents expected that Russia would lose territory due to Chinese expansion in the region (the slight increase is within the margin of error). Asked in 1998 how this feared Chinese expansion would take place, 16 percent of respondents said it would result from bilateral negotiations between Moscow and Beijing and 12 percent expected China to take Russian territory by force. The largest number of respondents, however, (28 percent) said territory would be lost due to a "peaceful infiltration" of Primor’e by Chinese nationals. The questionnaire defined "peaceful infiltration" as migrant labor, trade, tourism, and marriage.25

2. The number of Primor’e residents who liked the presence of Chinese nationals remained under 5 percent, with 4 percent fewer respondents (close to the single margin of error value) approving visits by Chinese nationals for "specific purposes" defined as migrant labor in industry and agriculture. Indirectly, this low acceptance of non-ethnic Russian nationals in Primor’e is confirmed by a low number of respondents supporting restoration of historic ethnic Korean settlements. (Even though the number of opponents of Korean settlements also decreased, all of those former opponents must have turned into the undecided).

Table 3. Attitudes toward China and Migrants from PRC in Primorskii krai, 1991-199826

3. Among social groups featured in the surveys (Addendum 1), Chinese occupation of Primor’e was viewed as more likely in 1998 than in 1994 by respondents with vocational-technical education (mostly, blue-collar workers), high-income recipients, owners of private businesses ("New Russians"), and the military. At the same time, fewer government employees and people with higher education believed Primor’e would lose territory to China. Similarly, lower levels of education and higher levels of income translated into significantly larger opposition to Chinese presence in Primorskii krai (even for short visits). These results are consistent with the contradictory impact of changing economic trends in 1993-1998 that brought about a decrease in benefits available to the general public, while increasing the utility of cross-border trade to government officials (most of whom also have higher education).

4. The significant (13 percent) increase from 1994 to 1998 of the share of respondents who opposed their relatives marrying Chinese nationals coincided with an even more sizeable (22 percent) drop of the number of respondents who considered such a decision to be their relatives’ personal issue. These numbers warn about the rising racist sentiments among Primor’e residents and the growing perception of Chinese nationals as "ethnic others" vis-à-vis the Russians.

5. Concurrently, the number of people who considered mass deportation of ethnic minorities by Stalin as the "manifestation of the leader’s wisdom" doubled, comprising one fifth of survey respondents. Thus, latent racist sentiments in Primor’e increased from 1994 to 1998 in synch with public support for massive state violence against ethnic minorities.

6. Shifts in perceptions of "typical characteristics" of ethnic Chinese migrants also reflect increasing potential for interethnic hostility in Primor’e. From 1994 to 1998, few Russians saw Chinese migrants as honest, polite and responsible. While viewed as increasingly hard working and entrepreneurial, Chinese migrants were also viewed as more aggressive and sly. These trends are consistent with the logic of conflict escalation under relative economic deprivation.27

To summarize, the opinion data suggests that security concerns in the Russian Far East arise from the growing perceptions of ethnic distance and from a growing sense of economic aggressiveness of Chinese nationals conducting business in Primor’e. A nontrivial implication of these public attitude shifts is that one would expect both bad demographic trends and good economic trends to induce interethnic hostility and anti-Chinese security mobilization.

Are growing security concerns of Primor’e residents translating into security mobilization, understood as a combination of activities (such as public events, coercive capacity building, and hostile acts) aimed at increasing the security of members of a nation state or group relative to members of another state or group?28 To address this issue, I have conducted a plausibility probe analysis of security mobilization in Dal’nerechenskii and Khasanskii counties of Primorskii krai.

As Table 4 shows, in both counties, demographic trends from 1993 to 1998 have been poor. Both counties are located along the Russian-Chinese border and have a history of border battles (Damanski Island in Dal’nerechenskii county and Lake Khasan in Khasanskii county). While Khasanskii county has a higher population density, it is also a major transit area for Chinese nationals going to Primor’e’s main trade and industry centers in Vladivostok and Ussuriisk. At the same time, Dal’nerechenskii county in 1996-98 generated more income from cross-border exchanges with China such as joint venture production, sales, and export-import operations. Dal’nerechenskii county’s greater remoteness from Primor’e’s main urban centers, its sparser population, and higher availability of tradable natural resources (notably timber) also make it more attractive for illicit natural resource trade.

Table 4. Demographic and Socioeconomic Conditions in Dal’nerechenskii and Khasanskii Counties of Primorskii Krai29

All articles dealing with China, Chinese nationals, border security, local economic and demographic trends were summarized (See Addendum 3 for publication details and summaries of all retrieved articles). Summaries focused on key actions, actors, and circumstances. With few exceptions most articles were coded as a single event. For the purposes of this study, I singled out the action types defined as cross-border cooperation and security mobilization. Cooperation was coded as economic (ECCOOP), security (SECOOP), and cultural (CUCOOP). Three types of security mobilization directed against China or Chinese nationals were identified and coded as "focusing events" (FOCEVENT), such as anniversaries or staged public events; "coercive capacity building" (COCAP), such as recruitment of border guards or Cossacks; and "hostile acts" (HOSACTS), such as arrests, deportations, and hostile speech. Actors were coded as governmental and non-governmental and military-related and non-military. For example, I coded a report about an anti-Chinese slogan at an entrance to a local market as a hostile act performed by a non-governmental, non-military actor. A recruitment campaign by Cossacks in one of the counties was coded as coercive capability building by a non-governmental, military-related actor.32

Table 5. Reported Levels of Anti-Chinese Security Mobilization and Cross-Border Cooperation with China in Dal’nerechenskii (DK) and Khasanskii (KN) Districts, 1996-1999.

Given a relatively small number of events in this data set for two counties and their varying significance, inferences must be made with caution. Several large differences in the number of events across counties and over time, however, do suggests a number of qualitative preliminary conclusions that can be drawn from this data:

1. Levels of hostility appear to be related to levels of cooperation and coercive capacity building. Nine hostile acts were reported in Khasanskii county in 1996, but only four in 1998/99. This drop in hostile acts happened under similar (and substantial) levels of reported cross-border cooperation, including an increase in security cooperation, and with continuing reports about coercive capacity building in the county. By contrast, only one hostile act was reported in Dal’nerechenskii county in 1997, but eight such acts were reported in 1998/99. This rise in the number of hostile acts happened after cross-border cooperation increased (bringing with it an increased influx of Chinese nationals that became targets of such acts), while coercive capacity building in the county declined. Also, most of hostile acts reported in Dal’nerechenskii county (5 out of 8) were performed by military-related actors (border guards, Cossacks, violent criminals). In Khasanskii county, 4 out of 9 hostile acts were by military-related actors in 1997, declining to 2 in 1998/99.

2. In Dal’nerechenskii district, the rise of cross-border economic exchanges from 1996 to 1999 has been associated with increasing levels of cooperation, while economic cooperation has been associated with security cooperation in both counties. The impact of economic incentives on security cooperation is illustrated by two reports published in Dal’nerech’e newspaper in 1999. In February, a Russian delegation from Dal’nerechensk led by the county police chief, a deputy head of the local public security service, and chief of the local department of general government security visited the neighboring Chinese city of Hulin. The Russian security chiefs were impressed by a marble-and-glass police headquarters in Hulin. Half a year later, a police department delegation from Hulin paid a return visit to negotiate the construction of a similar police headquarters in Dal’nerechensk. Local Russian and Chinese police chiefs also discussed measures to improve security at the Chinese wholesale warehouse in Dal’nerechensk.33

3. At the same time, the increase of the number of anti-Chinese hostile acts in Dal’nerechenskii county after 1996 suggests that initiation of economic interactions with China has destabilizing effects on Russian areas with negative economic and demographic trends, at least in the short term. Much as the opinion data, the event data for Dal’nerechenskii county shows that common Russians are likely to be responding to the mere presence of Chinese nationals on their territory rather than to the economic impact of cross-border exchanges. The dilemma facing Primorskii krai is that this economic impact will have to increase substantially and become associated with economic recovery to give cross-border exchanges a positive image. Yet, the increased presence of Chinese nationals in this case is likely to aggravate interethnic tensions before such profound economic effects can take place.

4. That opportunities to activate any such tensions abound in Primorskii krai, is suggested by the increase of the number of symbolic hostile acts in Dal’nerechenskii county, and a sharp rise from 1996/97 to 1998/99 of the number of reported focusing events in both counties. The use of anniversaries of border battles to mobilize the Russian nationalist vote in the run-up to elections in Russia and in Primorskii krai represented one such political act. In Dal’nerechenskii district in 1999, local politicians exploited the 30th anniversary of the battle with China over Damanskii Island—and these acts accounted for most of the increase in the number of anti-Chinese focusing events. If anything, the newspaper reports failed to convey the massive scale on which the Primorskii krai governor played the nationalist mobilization card with distinct anti-Chinese undertones. In his glossy, well-illustrated book issued prior to the election campaign in the fall of 1999 with a suggestive title, "And All of Russia behind My Back…," the governor raised the spectrum of "Asian Balkans" arising from interethnic and interstate disputes. In most of the photos in the book, he was featured posing with war veterans, Damanskii battle veterans, and Cossacks in military regalia, not with Chinese traders and tourists. Concurrently, a colleague at the Vladivostok Institute of History reported increased sightings of Russian National Unity (or "Slavic fascist") small group gatherings in public places. In late October 1999, this author observed at least a dozen freshly printed RNU posters on lampposts in downtown Vladivostok in places where they were absent in May, 1999. At that time, I found only one RNU poster in downtown Vladivostok after systematically searching the streets by car and on foot.

5. A combination of statistical and event data also warns against making linear projections about both economic cooperation and security (or nationalist) mobilization in Primorskii krai and, by extension, throughout the Russian Far East. In Khasanskii county, where only one Russian-Chinese joint business venture was officially registered from 1996 to 1998 without much impact on the local economy, the event data showed more reports about local attempts to improve economic cooperation with China than in Dal’nerechenskii county where joint ventures had an economic impact (Table 4). In other words, lack of economic cooperation (following, in part, earlier restrictive measures such as Operation Foreigner launched in 1994) gave rise after a period of continuing economic decline to the search for cross-border cooperation that could in future make Khasanskii district a more active zone of Russian-Chinese business activity. A sign that this is plausible was given by county manager, Anatolii Mel’nichenko who in late May 1999 supported the plan to set up an International Peace Park under the auspices of the United Nations, with headquarters in a Chinese border town of Fanjung. A multilateral agreement was signed about setting the park on 330 hectares spanning Russian, Chinese, and Korean territories. On the Russian side, construction plans envisioned the conversion of the former military settlement of Maiachnoe into a medicinal mud spa at and the construction of an international airport in the city of Kraskino.

Once cooperation increases, however, the concurrent perceptions of demographic and territorial insecurity would once again warrant restrictions on cross-border exchanges making anti-Chinese mobilization politically attractive. The strength of these views was evident in memoranda written for Primorskii krai government and for the Kremlin by the then representative of the President of the Russian Federation in Primor’e, arguing that developing this United Nations’ cross-border project would give China a chance to build its own oceanic port in the area, detract international cargo business from Russian ports, give rise to a Chinese naval base, and increase Chinese pollution of Russian waterways.34

6. Despite such views expressed by high level officials, the newspapers in the two counties reported no organized violence or mobilization directed against Chinese nationals despite opportunities for mobilizations presented by focusing events and some official rhetoric. The reports, however, captured a number of coercive capacity building and hostile acts by Cossacks, one capacity building episode by a fascist Russian National Unity and a number of reports about quasi-military patriotic youth groups sanctioned by the government. While relatively small in scale these activities indicate the presence of ideologically committed actors that could potentially serve as mobilizing agents in interethnic disputes. More security mobilizing activities by such groups and greater levels of government support for them were reported in the Khasan county where Chinese traffic was larger but economic benefits from Chinese exchanges lower than in Dal’nerechenskii county. While the overall levels of reported activities by such groups were weak, their very existence is a major warning sign. Such organized groups do not have to be numerous or even popular to destabilize interethnic relations at the time of a political crisis. An analysis of opinion poll data in 1993 established that in Primorskii krai approximately 5-10 percent of the population "has a proclivity for populism and political demagoguery, still adheres to the principles of command-administrative [Soviet] system, and supports the pseudoethnic entity, the Cossacks." At the time of political instability this segment of Primorskii krai population is likely to play the role of political catalyst for organized nationalist (if not fascist) activism.35

Primor’e Cossacks, represented by chieftain of the Ussuri Cossack Army, Vitalii Poluianov, have voiced strong organized opposition to Chinese economic activities in the Russian Far East. Poluianov said that he proposed to establish a Khasan Free Economic Zone on 15,000 hectares in Khasanskii county. By "free," Poluianov explained, he meant the area would be free of cross-border exchanges and international business, with a self-sufficient farming economy of Cossack communities. This, he said, would prevent Chinese traders from establishing compact settlements in the area—a vital security issue: "The ‘yellow peril’ is rising. We see the overpopulation of the neighboring nation. They will come here, give birth to multitudes of squint-eyed people and then claim political autonomy [from Russia]. . . . Even if we shoot and kill a million Chinese a year, this problem won’t go away."36 To deal more effectively with the threat of kitaizatsiia, Poluianov would like to see membership in the Ussuri Cossack Army to grow in years to come from the currently estimated 5,000 to 45,000 ("as before the revolution"). My event data set, however, contains only a few reports suggesting a rather modest Cossack membership growth in the two borderline counties.

Chinese migrants in Primorskii krai are at no immediate risk of mass hostility on behalf of local Russians. Besides, Chinese migrant population is mobile and has a viable and quick exit option from the area. Absent a general economic recovery, however, that can be credibly attributed to increasing cross-border interactions, interethnic tensions and anti-Chinese mobilization in Primorskii krai are likely to gradually increase given current demographic and economic trends. These conclusions reflect a preliminary assessment of the impact of economic incentives on interethnic relations in this study.

First, the theoretical analysis, the opinion data and the event data suggest that when cross-border exchanges fail to reverse general economic decline, the level of economic benefits from such exchanged has little impact on perceived threats to security and identity associated with cross-border migration. Thus, the number of respondents in surveys who expect Primorskii krai to lose territory to China was high and changed insignificantly from 1994 to 1998, consistent with long-term economic and demographic trends that favor China. Moreover, opinion data (questions 3-6) also suggests that under general economic decline, increasing cross-border interactions are likely to result in growing ethnic alienation and hostility despite economic benefits from these interactions—the outcome consistent with relative deprivation theory. Preliminary event data also supports this argument. The number of reported hostile acts against Chinese nationals in Dal’nerechenskii county increased sharply after cross-border exchanges increased in 1997 and generated tangible economic benefits.

Second, limited economic benefits (with plentiful opportunities for diversion of public funds for private gain), appear to have a disproportionate impact on perceptions of interethnic security and proclivity for security mobilization among (and within) government officials, business elites, and the general public. Opinion data shows, for example, that in 1994-98 government employees within non-military agencies in Primor’e (best positioned to benefit from corruption opportunities) were less likely to fear Chinese occupation and more likely to support Chinese presence in Primorskii krai than the military and the blue-collar workers (major non-elite segment). Polarization of incentives between civilian government elites, the military, and the general public would also explain why in 1996/97 more official cooperation with China and more hostile anti-Chinese acts were reported in Khasanskii county than in Dal’nerechenskii county. While in neither county significant economic activities with Chinese businesses were reported at the time, transit Chinese trade and tourist traffic gave Khasanskii county officials the opportunity to extract private gains that their counterparts in Dal’nerechenskii county lacked. This Chinese traffic (mostly absent in Dal’nerechensk) also generated targets for hostile acts in Khasan. It may also be the case that anticipation of greater economic benefits from cross-border cooperation accounted for a drop of reported acts of government support for non-governmental nationalist groups with military capabilities (such as the Cossacks) from 1996/97 to 1998/99 in both counties.

Third, these selective incentives also explain a differentiation of government activities with regard to Chinese nationals. On the one hand, officials have increased the use of nationalist symbolism—evident during 1999 in Nazdratenko’s election campaign and in the increased number of anti-Chinese focusing events reported in Khasanskii and Dal’nerechenskii counties. On the other hand, the same officials continued cooperation and somewhat reduced interactions with nationalist groups. For example, much coercive capability building was reported in Dal’nerechenskii county in 1996, but none in 1999. And in January 2000, Vladivostok City government announced that it would allow employment in the city of up to 4,000 foreign workers—a more than threefold increase from 1999’s quota of 1,300.37 At about the same time, courts in Primorskii krai banned public advertising by the neo-fascist Russian National Unity. Without a turnaround in general economic and demographic conditions in the region, however, this policy bifurcation is likely to be destabilizing. While increasing the number of Chinese migrant traders and workers (which is, in many cases, an inescapable economic imperative), Primor’e officials are also increasing symbolic activities focusing the (already suspicious) general public on potential security threats of increased Chinese presence. These trends will undermine the current equilibrium between slowly growing economic gains and slowly growing ethnic hostility.

Finally, these findings have a major policy implication: If cross-border exchanges become associated with economic revival of Primorskii krai (through increased investment and local economic development) then the selective incentives that currently soften nationalist positions of government officials will also be likely to spread to the general public, inducing more benign and cooperative attitudes toward Chinese nationals. If not, the interethnic equilibrium is likely to become more fragile, giving rise to more hostile acts. At present, despite some negative trends in interethnic relations in Primor’e, the window of opportunity exists to promote the benign scenario, for the following reasons:

• Most government elites in Primorskii krai (and hence the positive side effect of corrupt practices) have experienced economic benefits of cross-border cooperation with China. Even in a county with historically contested territories, such as Khasan, local government officials have recently expressed support for the International Peace Park under the UN auspices (subject to international investment) at the juncture of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean borders in the Tyumen river basin.
• Ideologically committed nationalist groups, such as the Cossacks and the Russian National Unity, still lack substantial membership and organization to conduct systematic anti-Chinese activities.
• While hostility toward Chinese nationals increased in the 1990s, public support for cooperation still remains strong.

The study suggests that this window of opportunity is likely to be slowly narrowing, unless the Russian government at various levels, major non-governmental actors, outside powers, international organizations, and businesses recognize both the perils and the promises arising from the current economic-versus-security equilibrium and act to create economically effective transborder regions along Russia-China border.

Appendix-1

CODEBOOK:Monitoring Cross-Border Cooperation and Anti-Chinese Security Mobilization in Primorskii Krai, 1993-1999

Purpose: Using the data collected during my research in Vladivostok in 1999 under the grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (U.S. Department of State, Title VIII), this codebook is designed to assess reported levels of cross-border cooperation and security mobilization in Primorskii krai’s counties by tracking reports in the local press. The key question is: How do various actors in Primorskii krai respond to perceived territorial insecurity and to socioeconomic benefits of cross-border exchanges with China?

1. Major support for the work reported in this paper has come from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (Fellowship Grant Agreement Number 814-17g). The author would like to thank the University Research Council, the College of Arts and Scienes, the International Studies Program and the Department of Political Science at the Appalachian State University, and the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for providing additional financial support. The author thanks Professors Herbert Ellison and Stephen Hanson of the University of Washington for their helpful comments at the initial stages of the project, and to the National Bureau of National Research (and Bruce Acker, in particular) for its editorial assistance with the project proposal and for processing and submitting the initial application to NCEEER. The project was conducted in collaboration with Tamara Troyakova and Yevgenii Plaksen of the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The author thanks them for providing data, arranging meetings and field trips and for helping to conduct interviews during his research trip to Vladivostok, May 16-June 3, 1999. I also thank my research assistant at the Appalachian State University, Jacek Wasilewski, for his hard and dedicated work on this project.

2. Mikhail Alexseev, "Chinese Migration in Primorskii Krai: An Assessment of Its Scale, Socioeconomic Impact and Opportunities for Corruption." Working Paper, The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (grant contract #814-17g), November, 1999, p. 5.

3. In this view, intellectuals are the first to realize such threats and to activate nationalist symbols mobilizing public support and leading to collective action directed at another ethnic group. See Harold Issacs, Idols of the tribe: Group identity and political change (New York: Harper and Row, 1975) and, especially, Anthony D. Smith, The ethnic origins of nations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986). , Anthony D. Smith, "The ethnic sources of nationalism." In Ethnic Conflict and International Security, edited by Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Hudson Meadwell, in "Cultural and Instrumental Approaches to Ethnic Nationalism," Ethnic and Racial Studies 12 (July 1989): 309-28 refers to this view as "expressivist culturalism." For a practical and politically influential exemplar of essentialism, see Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

4. Peter Kirkow, Russia's Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation Versus Local Autonomy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

5. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, (London: Verso, 1983). John Chipman, "Managing the Politics of Parochialism," in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, edited by Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) argues that pathological social systems rapidly lead to "total" ethnic violence, since "everyone is automatically labeled a combatant-by the identity they possess-even if they are not" (p. 240).

6. Stephen Van Evera, "Nationalism and the Causes of War," in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 146-47.

7. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, edited by Michael E. Brown (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-125.

8. James D. Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds. The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 107-127.

9. David L. Laitin and James D. Fearon, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review (December 1996): Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report (New York, 1997), p. 3. Individual instances of interethnic violence would still occur validating prophecies of ancient hatreds, but so would violent acts such as crime that are not ethnically motivated. At the same time, when mass violence does break out among ethnic groups, "ancient hatreds" and conflicting ethnic motivations enter the stage as the most obvious and immediate explanations of death and destruction.

10. Two major exceptions happened in the border town of Pogranichnyi. At the local central market I witnessed a heated row between a Chinese trader and a Russian custom (a young male who was not sober). The Russian customer accused the trader (without deleting expletives) of bringing in inferior products, threw some of the wares displayed at the stand in the Chinese nationals' face, and tried to take the Chinese person's peanuts without permission. Another Chinese trader came to help and slapped the Russian customer forcefully on the hand. The two traders removed the peanuts from the customer's hand by force. The second episode involved Russian railroad security officials who stopped a Chinese woman near the public latrines by the railway station and demanded a fine for unauthorized walking on the railroad track. The Russian officials were armed and they removed the Chinese woman's passport. A dozen, or so members of the Chinese tourist delegation (from Harbin) surrounded the security officials and passionately argued the woman's case. After a heated row, several members of the Chinese delegation went to settle the case into a building housing the Special Security Detachment for the Protection of the Far Eastern Railways.

11. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Ethnicity: Theory and experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975); Milton J. Esman, Ethnic politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).

12. Alexseev, "Chinese Migration in Primorskii Krai."

13. Andres Aslund, "Russia's Collapse," Foreign Affairs (September/October, 1999): 64-77; Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, "Russia's Virtual Economy," Foreign Affairs (September/October, 1998): 53-67.

14. On institutional traps, see Judith Thornton, "Has Russian Reform Failed?" National Bureau of Asian Research working paper, 1999 (http://www.nbr.org/members/thornton.pdf). For a case study of political elites' ability to block or distort economic reform in Primor'e see Peter Kirkow, Russia's Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation versus Local Autonomy? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

15. Stephen E. Hanson, "Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Uncertainty in Postcommunist Russia," Program on New Approaches to Russian Security, Policy Memo #40 (1999).

16. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Books, 1963); W. Lance Bennett, The Political Mind and the Political Environment: An Investigation of Public Opinion and Political Consciousness (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1975); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 132.

17. "Zakon Primorskogo kraia o kraevom biudzhete na 1995 god," Vedomosti Dumy Primorskogo kraia, no. 8 (1995): 4-21; "Zakon Primorskogo kraia o kraevom biudzhete na 1996 god," Vedomosti Dumy Primorskogo kraia, no. 23 (1996): 2-25; "Zakon Primorskogo kraia o kraevom biudzhete na 1997 god," Vedomosti Dumy Primorskogo kraia," no. 44 (1997): 2-25; "Zakon Primorskogo kraia o kraevom biudzhete na 1998 god," Vedomosti Dumy Primorskogo kraia, no. 13 (1998): 2-37. Ruble values were converted into dollar values at half-year average exchange rate increments and the January 1998 three-digit ruble denomination was taken into account (the denomination is reflected in the orginal documents).

18. Primorskii and Khabarovskii krai, Yevreiskaia (Jewish) Autonomous Oblast, and Amurskaia oblast.

19. P. Ia. Baklanov, "Geographicheskiie, sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie, i geopoliticheskiie factory migratsii kitaiskogo naseleniia na yug Dal'nego Vostoka," paper presented at the roundtable, "Prospects for the Far East Region: The Chinese Factor," Institute of History, Archeology, and Ethnography of the Far Eastern Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok, July 9, 1999, p. 3.

20. Interview with Andrei Kopayev, senior investigator at the same office. Vladivostok, May 25, 1999.

21. Institut Istorii, Arkheologii I Etnografii Narodov Dal'nego Vostoka DVO RAN, "Migratsiia inostrantsev v Primorskom krae I vo Vladivostoke. Anketa dlia kitaiskikh torgovtsev." (Vladivostok, 1999), pilot survey results, pp. 5-6.

22. "Administration Does Not Know How to Resolve the 'Chinese Question' in Primor'e," Zolotoy Rog, April 1, 1999.

23. "Ob istinnykh masshtabakh torgovli mozhno tol'ko dogadyvat'sya," Zolotoi Rog, March 2, 1999.

24. Based on Alexseev, "Chinese Migration in Primorskii Krai."

25. Plaksen, "Sotstium Vladivostoka: Osen'- '98, p. 2.

26. Plaksen, Yevgenii. "Sotstium Vladivostoka: Osen'- '91, '92, '94, '97, '98" [Vladivostok opinion survey results: autumn, 1991, '92, '94, '97, '98], Interim Report, Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, Russian Academy of Sciences, Far Eastern Branch, 1998.

27. See T.R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press, 1970), Edward L. Azar and John W. Burton, International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (Lynn Reinner, 1986). Relative deprivation occurs when economic growth in sectors associated with a different ethnic group (e.g., Chinese migrants) threatens to accentuate and aggravate ethnic grievances, especially amidst general economic decline and scarcity, as in Russia. Groups are likely to "conclude that they can improve their welfare only at the expense of others" (David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds. The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation [Princeton University Press, 1998], 10) and opt for nationalism (Milica Zarkovic Bookman, Economic Decline and Nationalism in the Balkans [St. Martin's, 1994]).

28. For the definition of these concepts see my "Codebook: Monitoring Anti-Chinese Security Mobilization in Primorskii krai, 1993-1999," Addendum 2 to this working paper.

29. Based on the data reported in Mikhail Alexseev, "Chinese Migration in Primorskii Krai," (revised version, November 1999), tables 2-5, 7, 8, A1, A11.

30. Interfax, "Governor Wants US Marine Landing in Vladivostok Canceled," (July 31, 1998), in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), reported August 5, 1998.

31. Tvoi vybor, Nos. 5 (February 16) and 8 (March 27), 1999.

32. I have adapted the basic actor-action coding scheme used by the Global Event-Data System (University of Maryland) for this particular test, with specific types of actors and actions, listed in the "Codebood" (Addendum 1). Available newspaper stories for Dal'nerechenskii county covered years 1996, 1998 (January 15 to February 3 only), and 1999; and years 1997, 1998 (February 1 to March 12 only), and 1999 for Khasanskii county. Even though articles for Dal'nerechenskii county for 1997 were unavailable, this data set appears suitable for comparing changes in security mobilization in these counties from 1996/97 to 1999, considering little difference in socioeconomic and demographic trends from 1996 to 1997 and no major intervening political factors (such as a major shift in Sino-Russian relations or political leadership change within Russia and Primorskii krai).

33. Irina Aleshina, "Our People in China," Dal'nerech'e (February 4, 1999), p. 2; "A Visit of Police Officers," Dal'nerech'e (August 31, 1999), p. 2.

34. Vladimir Ignatenko, "Spravka: k voprosu o demarkatsii rossiisko-kitaiskoi granitsy v Primorskom krae" [Memorandum: on the issue of Russian-Chinese border demarcation in Primorskii krai], 1996. Vladimir Ignatenko is chairman of the committee on regional affairs at the Primorskii krai duma. The committee has jurisdiction over all issues dealing with Chinese migration and cross-border exchanges. A copy of this memorandum, bearing no date, was obtained directly from Vladimir Ignatenko who estimated it was written in May of 1996. Inteview, Vladivostok, June 1, 1999.

35. Yevgenii Plaksen, "Integratsiia Primorskogo kraia v ekonomicheskuiu strukturu ATR: obshchestvennoe mnenie naseleniia i osobennosti vzgliadov rukovodstva," [Integration of Primorskii krai into the economy of the Asia Pacific region: public opinion and characteristics of elite opinion] Rossiia I ATR 2 (1993): 49.

36. Interview, Vladivostok, June 1, 1999.

37. Rossiia. Regiony. Novosti. (January 10, 2000) (www.regions.ru/news/160287.htm).

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